My Quadrivium of Poetry

by Christian Bök

 

[Abstract for “Two Dots Over a Vowel” (Boundary 2 36.3 (Fall 2009): 11-24.]

 

When teaching poetry to my students, I strive to convey the diverse variety of aesthetic attitudes that can define the value of a style, and I usually begin by asking questions about what kind of game a student might wish to play. I argue that, if we accept that all poetry involves both an attitude toward intentionality (i.e. the act of needing to tell) and an attitude toward expressiveness (i.e. the act of telling a need), then there are only four ways to play the game of poetry itself: cognitive, automatic, mannerist, and aleatoric.

 

A. Cognitive Writing

Works that embody, as values, both intentionality and expressiveness, I might describe as “cognitive.” These works aspire to be both self-conscious and self-assertive. They do so in order to minimize any discrepancy between what the self might intend and what the text might convey. An author must embrace both voluntary self-control and voluntary self-exhibit. We witness the self thinking to itself, alone and aloud, about itself, bearing witness to the intimacy, if not to the quietude, of its own thoughtful confession.

(Think of poets who articulate themselves in a plainer, sincere form, equal to the tranquil emotions of retrospection: William Wordsworth, Robert Lowell, Elizabeth Bishop, etc.)

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B. Automatic Writing

Works that embody, as values, less intentionality and more expressiveness, I might describe as “automatic.” These works aspire, not to be self-conscious, but to be self-assertive. They do so in order to maximize what the text might convey at the expense of what the self might intend. An author must forfeit voluntary self-control, but embrace potential self-exhibit. We witness the self speaking to itself without thinking about itself, bearing witness to the outburst of its own irrational, if not vertiginous, exuberance.

(Think of poets who articulate themselves in a complex, baroque form, equal to the ecstatic feelings of deliriousness: André Breton, Allen Ginsberg, Kathy Acker, etc.)

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C. Mannerist Writing

Works that embody, as values, more intentionality and less expressiveness, I might describe as “mannerist.” These works aspire to be self-conscious, but not to be self-assertive. They do so in order to maximize what the self might intend at the expense of what the text might convey. An author must embrace potential self-control, but forfeit voluntary self-exhibit. We witness the self as it subordinates its own subjectivity to a rigorous procedure, thereby bearing witness to the outcome of a formalized experiment.

(Think of poets who articulate structures in a precise, orderly form, equal to the rational precepts of scientificity: Raymond Queneau, Raymond Roussel, Unica Zürn, etc.)

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D. Aleatoric Writing

Works that embody, as values, no intentionality and no expressiveness, I might describe as “aleatoric.” These works are neither self-conscious nor self-assertive. Such authors forfeit both voluntary self-control and voluntary self-exhibit. An author delegates authorship to the otherness of chance, and a reader, in turn, judges the uncanniness of these results. We witness the self as it subordinates its own subjectivity to an arbitrary procedure, thereby bearing witness to the outcome of a stochastic experiment.

(Think of poets who strive to articulate structures in an uncanny, ergodic form, equal to the oracular surprise of synchronicity: John Cage, Jackson Mac Low, Yoko Ono, etc.)

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Cognitive, automatic, mannerist, aleatoric—this “quadrivium” of poetry exhausts every means of permuting the relationship between intentionality and expressiveness.

Each represents a kind of game: for example, cognitive writing (with its demand for a realistic depiction of subjective experience) might be a game of mimicry; automatic writing (with its demand for a delirious depiction of subjective experience) might be a game of vertigo; mannerist writing (with its demand for a virtuosic overthrow of a procedural constraint) might be a game of prowess; and aleatoric writing (with its demand for a receptive deference to all stochastic exigencies) might be a game of fortune. I suspect that most aesthetic arguments about the value of style arise largely because scholars misjudge the merit of a given game according to the rules of some other game.

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